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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
~fll!IE URE BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD MILLS BAKER, 
Defendant. 
STATEMIDNT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a decree entered in the 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, on the 
27th day of September, 1949·, finding the appellant in 
contempt of court, modifying the decree entered between 
the parties to the above entitled action on the 30th day 
of June, 1948, and making other orders relating to the 
rights of the above named parties and their two minor 
children ( Tr. pages 062-063). 
In the decree of divorce entered June 30, 1948, the 
care, custody and control of Joan Carol Baker and Jean 
Baker, the two minor daughters, then five and three 
years of age respectively, were ayvarded to their mother, 
the appellant, subject to the right of visitation of the 
respondent at all reasonable times and places. The 
respondent was ordered to pay to the appellant at the 
office of the clerk of the court the sum of $50.00 per 
month for the support and maintenance of each child, 
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or the total sum of $100.00 per month, payable $50.00 
on the lOth day and $50.00 on the 25th day of each month 
beginning with July, 1948 (Tr. 021-022). 
A complete settlement of the property rights be-
tween the parties was made through an award of certain 
property to the appellant, and she was given no award 
whatever for alimony (Tr. 021-023). 
In the pleadings for modification, reference is made 
to alimony for the appellant, but that is a misstatement. 
The hearing was conducted on the theory that all rights 
between the parties were settled at the time of the 
divorce, and the respondent was ordered to make pay-
ments for the support of the minor children only. 
In the Findings of Fact and Decree as originally 
entered, the Court found that the respondent is an able 
bodied man capable of earning $300.00 or more per 
month, and fully employed ( Tr. 018). In the findings 
used as the basis for the decree and order herein ap-
pealed from, the court found that the respondent is 
still employed and now receives take-home-pay of 
$350.00 to $400.00 per month ( Tr. 095). In the respond-
ent's ovm testimony given at the hearing for modifi-
cation, he admitted that at the time of the hearing he 
was earning approximately $400.00 per month (B. of 
Ex. 5), and that the award for the support of the 
children was based not upon the property owned by the 
respondent at the time the decree was entered, but upon 
his earnings (B. of Ex. 6). The-re was no claim that 
the sum of $100.00 for the support of the two minor 
children is more than they need, or that it constitutes a 
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burden upon the respondent, \Yho has no other depend-
ents. The elaim for reduction "~as made solely upon 
the ground that the children had been taken to the state 
of Oregon \\~here is \Yas difficult for the respondent to 
Yisit them. There is no claim at all that the. welfare 
of the children is not promoted through the change of 
residence to Oregon, or is there any claim whatsoever 
that the appellant is anything but a kind and exemplary 
mother, fully deserving· of the custody of the children, 
and one \\'"ho cares properly for the children. An ad-
ditional fact is that the respondent at the time of the 
filing of his petition for modification was admittedly 
in arrears $350.00, and at the time the appellant cited 
him into court he owed an additional $100.00. Further-
more, he had refused to pay $250.00 attorneys' fees and 
costs in the sum of $56.20 awarded under the original 
decree (B. of Ex. 10). There is no express provision 
in the decree against the removal of the children from 
the State of Utah. For findings in original action see 
Tr. 017-018. 
In the fall of 1948, the appellant sold her property 
in Weber County and purchased property in Nyssa, 
Oregon, where she could live in the same community with 
and receive assistance from her sisters and daughters 
(B. of Ex. 20 and 24). When the respondent failed to 
make payments under the terms of the decree, the 
appellant caused him to be cited into court and thereby 
initiated the proceedings resulting in this appeal. 
The court in the decree appealed from found the 
respondent in contempt only because of his failure to 
pay the $250.00 attorneys' fees and costs awarded under 
the original decree, and permitted him to purge himself 
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from contempt by paying the amounts due for attorneys' 
fees and costs (Tr. 062-063). Although the respondent 
was admittedly in arrears in the sum of $100.00 at the 
time the appellant left the State of Utah and moved to 
Oregon in November, 1948, and was in arrears an 
additional $350.00 before he made any application· for 
a modification of the decree, the court did not find him 
in contempt on those items. However, the court found 
the appellant in contempt for removing the children 
from the State of Utah without the consent of the court, 
and in effect fined her $350.00 and rewarded the re-
spondent to the extent of $350.00 by holding that the 
appellant could not collect the $350.00 past due and 
unpaid at the time the respondent applied for modifi-
cation. The court further reduced the amounts payable 
to the children from $50.00 each to $30.00 each per month 
and refused to modify the decree so as to expressly 
give consent for the appellant to keep the children in 
Oregon, although by implication such consent is found 
in the decree. The reduction in effect is an additional 
puntitive measure against the mother for taking the 
children to Oregon. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON FOR RE-
VERSAL OR MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
It is the contention of the appellant that the court 
erred in modifying the original decree herein reducing 
the amount payable by the respondent for the support 
of the children from $100.00 to $60.00 per month he~ 
cause no change of circumstances sufficient to warrant 
said modification was shown. If anything respondent's 
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earning power has improve~ since the entry of the orig-
inal dec-ree. In the second place, the trial court erred 
in holding the appellant in contempt because the record 
does not sho\Y any intentional violation of a court order. 
As a matter of fact, there \vas no e~press or direct order 
of the court prohibiting or forbidding the removal of 
the children from this state. In the third place, the court 
erred in that it exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the 
penalty which 'vas levied against the appellant. In the 
fourth place, the court erred in depriving the appellant 
of her right to collect the accrued installments for the 
support of the children, and allowing the respondent 
to keep the money in question, and in hearing respond-
ent on his petition for modification while he was in de-
fault under the decree. Furthermore, the court erred 
by taking from the children the money awarded to them 
under the guise of punishing the mother for contempt . 
. The court erred in granting respondent relief for period 
before respondent applied to court for modification, and 
in not giving appellant an opportunity to purge herself 
from contempt if she were in contempt. The court 
further erred i~ refusing to modify the decree so as to 
give the appellant the express right to change the 
residence of the children to the State of Oregon when 
it appears that the move was for the best interest of the 
children. 
The court erred in refusing to enter the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and decree submitted by the 
appellant because they were the only findings, con-
clusions and decree supported by the evidence. 
The court erred in rejecting the evidence offered 
by the appellant concerning the unfitness of the re-
spondent to be alone \\'ith the t\vo minor daughters. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DE-
CREE REDUCING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY 
PAYMENTS TO BID MADE FOR THE SUPPORT 
OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE NO CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT 
MODIFICATION WAS SHOWN. 
In Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456 at 469, the court held 
that ''under the statute, when judicial action is properly 
invoked, the court, as to orders which relate to alimony, 
custody of children, and awards for their support, when 
they are co-ntinuing and over which the court retains 
a continuing jurisdiction, is authorized on a proper 
showing to modify the decree in such particulars. But 
a further essential to such relief, and which is univer· 
sa.Zly agreed upon, is that there must be averments and 
proof of a change of circumstances or conditions of the 
parties .. 0 ' ' 
The Utah court enlarged upon this statement in 
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, at 269, by holding 
'' ... In 7 Std. Ency. of Proc. at Page 843, in speaking 
of proceedings to modify a decree of divorce, it is said: 
'A further essential to such relief which is universally 
agreed upon is that there must be a change of- circum~ 
stances, or newly discovered facts to warrant such re-
lief, or it cannot be granted.' 
''In Shouler on Divorce (6th Ed.) Vol. 2, Sec. 1831, 
the author says: 'Modification can only be ordered on 
proof of change of conditions, as the decree is final as 
to conditions existing at the tjme, and a slight change is 
not enough to warrant modification.' '' 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Still again the Supreme l~ourt of U tab held in Rock-
wood Y. Rock"~ood, 65 Utah at 268 and 269, " ... The 
duty of the father to support his children, if he is able 
to do so, is imposed in this state by positive statute. It 
would be his duty in any event if there were no statute 
upon the subject. Defendant has not shown, either in 
his affidaYit or eYidence, that he is less able now to 
contribute to the support of his children than he was 
\vhen the orig·inal dec.ree was entered. He has not shown 
that the mother of the children is able -to support them, 
and, even if he had, it is not clear that such fact would 
alter the case. He has not shown that the children now 
require less for their support than when the decree was 
entered. In fact, the court will take judicial notice· that 
the children are still mere infants, dependent entirely 
upon someone else for their maintenance and support.'' 
The Rockwood case presented substantially the 
same situation as the instant case. There is here no 
showing of change in the circumstances that existed 
at the time of the divorce decree except that the child-
ren are no longer in the state of Utah. The father's 
earnings are now better than at the time of the decree. 
The original findings 'vere that the ''defendant is 
a strong, able-bodied man, capable of earning $300.00 
or more per month (Tr. 018). 
In the proceedings appealed from the respondent 
testified and the court found that the "Defendant re-
ceives at the present time ''take home pay'' of approxi-
mately $350.00 to $400.00 per month, the amount vary-
ing" (Tr. 059). 
Under the Utah decisions above cited it is clear 
beyond question that this is not a case where change of 
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circumstances will support a modification of the decree. 
The modification is just an additional penal measure 
used against the appellant to the substantial detriment 
of the children. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT 
GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND EXCE:EDED ITS 
JURISDICTION BY IMPOSING THE PENALTIES 
LEVIED AGAINST HER. 
Obviously, a person must be guilty of some definite 
act or omission before he can be found in contempt of 
c.ourt. Then if a person is found in contempt, the 
penalties imposed must be in accordance with law and 
not arbitrary. 
It is provided by statute in our state that "The 
following acts or omissions in respect to a court of 
justice or proceedings therein are contempts of the 
authority of the court: ... " (U.C.A. 1943, 104-45-1). 
Thereafter are set forth acts or omissions which consti .. 
tute contempt. It is ne.cessary, under this statute, for 
a person to have committed one of the acts required in 
order to be guilty of contempt. Such ·a statute as this 
is exclusive and it is a definite requirement for a con-
tempt finding to be made that it be made on one of the 
twelve subdivisions of this statute. 
The only subdivision of this section which has any 
application to the instant case is subdivision 5. It reads 
as follows, to-wit: ''Disobedience of any lawful judg-
ment, order of process of the court.'' The finding of 
contempt on the part of the appellant is that she ''has 
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wilfully deprived defendant of the right to visit with 
his children at reasonable times and places, and has 
rendered it impossible for defendant to see his said 
children at or near his place of residence, or within this 
state, since a date prior to November 25, 1948 . . . '' 
Tr. 062). 
There "~as no court order expressly prohibiting the 
appellant from removing the minor children of the 
parties from the State of Utah. The decree stated only 
that the children • 'Be and they are hereby awarded to 
the plaintiff, subject to the right of visitation in the 
defendant at all reasonable times and places" (Tr. 021). 
She violated no "la,vful judgment, order or process of 
the court'', therefore, when she took the children to 
Oregon. 
The same situation was before the Alabama court 
in Ex Parte Vaughn, 87 So. 792. The divorce ·decree 
awarded a minor child to the mother in these· words, 
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the 
court that the care, custody and control of William 
··Dudley Vaughn ... he and hereby is given to the com-
plainant, with the rig·ht of the respondent to see and 
visit said child at such reasonable times and places as 
will not interfere with the pr_oper control of said child 
by complainant. . . . '' Both parties remarried. Com-
plainant took the minor child to live in New York with-
out getting a court order permitting her so to do. On 
a petition by the respondent for custody of the child the 
complainant demurred. The respondent had the de-
murrer stricken on the grounds that complainant was 
in contempt for having taken the child out of the state 
without a court order. The court held, ''Here the 
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petitioner was awarded the custody of her infant child, 
and given the right to again· contract marriage, with 
nothing in the decree either directly or indirectly, pro-
hibiting her living in other jurisdictions outside of the 
state of Alabama, and the right of respondent to visit 
the child was prescribed for such reasonable times and 
places as would not interfere with the proper control 
by complainant. It has been held that the charge of 
contempt cannot he established for failure to comply 
with uncertain orders or judgments. 9 Cyc. 11. We 
think it very elear that petitioner here could not be 
punished for contempt for disobedience of an order 
of the court, as was allege<;l in the motion. . . 
"Moreover, in cases of this character it must be 
recalled that the welfare of the child is of paramount 
importance, and it may be seriously questioned that a 
parent when not in willful contempt should he deprived 
of the right to interpose a defense as to its custody, 
when brought into court for such purpose by the oppos-
ing parent. '' 
The eourt here recognizes that the welfare of the 
children of the parties is being best served by their being 
in Oregon. Otherwise the court would have had no 
choice but to have ordered them returned to its juris-
diction in Utah. No such order was made or requested. 
Tacit recognition is given to our claim that the welfare 
of the children is best subserved by the appellant in 
continuing their presence in Oregon by the fact that 
no finding was made that their welfare would be fur-
thered through their return to Utah. 
There is no violation of a court order involved in 
the finding of contempt against appellant unless it be 
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that the court found appella.nt g·uilty of contempt for 
failure to allow respondent to visit the children in Utah. 
The evidence on this point is to the effect that respond-
ent made littl0 effort to see the children for substantial 
periods of time (Tr. p. 21) and that vvhen he did come 
his presence upset the children and ''made them nervous 
and irritable', (Tr. p. 22). The \velfare of the children 
once more would demand that they not be upset. Sta-
bility and confidence are needed by children · of their 
ages and emotional upsets are clearly contrary to their 
well-being. Furthermore, there could be no basis for a 
finding of contempt while appellant resided in Utah 
because there was no express order of the court violated 
by appellant. 
The viev~T that taking the children out of the state 
of original jurisdiction without a court order, when 
there is no express prohibition in the decree of divorce 
against it, will not constitute contempt is given added 
authority in the case of Barnes v. Lee, 275 P. 661, an 
Oregon case. A divorce was granted in Oklahoma. 
Custody of the child was awarded to the father sub-
ject to the right of the mother to visit the child at 
proper times and places and also to have it visit her 
for one month in each year during school vacation. The 
father moved to Oregon and took the child with him. 
The mother attempted to regain custody in Oklahoma 
and got a court order in that court for custody. This 
Oklahoma order \Vas then presented to the -Oregon court 
asking that it be enforced, but the Oregon court said, 
''There was not disobedience of the order of the Okla-
homa court in Lee's con1ing to this state and bringing 
the child with him, as long as there was no provision 
10 
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in the order that she was not to be taken from the state. 
Concerning this feature in the case, i:p. Stetson v .. Stet· 
son, 80 Me. 483, 485, A. 60, 61; it is said: 'That the-
result of the decree may cause the removal of the child 
beyond the limits of the state, is not of itself an objection. 
This may be the effect in any case. Though the parent 
receiving the custody may at the time be a resident 
within the state, there is no authority, except in cases 
of crime, to prevent an immediate removal.' 
''Although the foregoing may be stating the rule 
rather strongly, we are clearly of the opinion that, 
unless either the terms of the decree or its necessary-
implications forbids the removal of the child from the 
state, there is no violation of the order.'' 
In the instant case it would he necessary for the 
court to torture words to the extent of saying that the 
''necessary implications forbid the removal of the 
child from the state'' in order to have grounds for a 
contempt holding. That the right of reasonable visi-
tation, as applied by the court of this state, goes that 
far is straining far past the meaning of the words. 
The annotation in 88 A.L.R. at 200 cites the case 
of Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206, as follows: "In 
Campbell v. Campbell ... it was held that where the 
judgment of divorce awarded the custody of the child 
of the parties to the wife, reserving to the husband the 
right to visit it once a week, but did not expressly pro-
hibit the wife from taking the child to another juris-
diction for good cause did not constitute even a technical 
contempt of court, and did not bar her from obtaining 
11 
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a modification of the decree for alimony in her favor 
as proYided by ~tntute, Or from recovering the alimony 
already accrued.'' 
This deci8ion i~ in line \Yith our thinking that the 
right of reasonable Yisitation is not violated by the re-
moval of the children from the state in the absence of 
an express or implied order of the court not to remove 
children from its jurisdiction, and that if they are re-
moved there is no taint of contempt in the removal. The 
removal of the children from the state in the instant 
case 'Yas a reasonable exercise of the right of control 
by the appellant. She acted as she felt the best good 
of the children required (Tr. P. 20). 
In the absence of an express provision in the divorce 
decree or in the statutes of this state, it was not con-
tempt of the court for the mother to whom custody was 
awarded to remove the minor children awarded to her 
from the jurisdiction. Even where such a practice is 
frowned upon, the husband is not relieved of his duty 
to support the children because they are no longer in 
the state, and his right of visitation has been circum-
scribed. At common law and by statutory enactment 
in many states it was and is the duty of the father to 
support his minor chiidren. 
The Supreme Court of l\Iichigan in Kane vs. Kane, 
216 N. W. 438, pointed out the problem in saying, "Ac.-
cess to the child by the parent denied custody is an im-
portant right. It is recognized that awarding custody 
to a non-resident parent may render the privilege of 
visitation impracticable in many cases. That privilege 
is not an absolute right, but one which must yield to 
12 
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the good of the child. Waldref v. Waldref, 159 N.W. 
1068; Bedolfe v. Bedolfe, 127 P. 594; 19 C. J. 348. Its 
feasible exercise should be safeguarded by the decree, 
but only to the extent it may be done without opposing 
the best interest of the child. Where the proofs are 
convincing, the welfare of the child demands that course 
be taken, its custody may and should be awarded to the 
non-resident parent, not"\\rithstanding the effect may be 
the defeat of visitation by the resident parent. 
''That a father is deprived of access to his child by 
a divorce decree does not relieve him from obligation 
to support it. Whether he is refused the right of visit-
ation because found unfit, or its exercise is obstructed 
by permitting the residence of the child in a foreign 
jurisdiction, he may nevertheless be charged with its 
maintenance. A contrary rule would be preposterous. 
It would mean _that a husband and a father, who applied 
for and obtained a divorce in this state from his wife 
residing with their child, in for example a country of 
Europe, or against whom a divorce is granted on the 
cross-bill of the nonresident wife is to be relieved of all 
obligation to contribute to the support of the infant 
unless it is brought aeross the ocean to facilitate his 
right of visitation.'' 
In the instant case the court has found, for all in-
tents and purposes, that it is proper for the appellant 
to retain custody of the minor children and that this 
c.an be done by retaining residenee in the state of 
Oregon. Yet, the eourt also held that the appellant was 
in contempt of court for having taken the ehildren to 
the state of Oregon without a court order because the 
removal of the children to the state of Oregon restricted 
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the respondent in his rights of visitation. This propo-
sition is '·preposterous'' under the doctrine of the Kane 
case. If the 'Yelfar~ of the children is best served by 
their continued residence in the state of Oregon, that 
is the important matter for the court to consider. There 
was no 'vilful intent on the part of the appellant to 
disobey any court order in moving "'\vith her children 
to Oregon (Tr. ~0). As a matter of fact, there was no 
court order to prevent her from so removing the children. 
''Unless the decree expressly or impliedly forbids 
removal, there is no violation of the order by removing 
the child from the state ... A father is not entitled to 
have alimony payments suspended because the children 
are outside the jurisdiction if he has no right to see the 
children or if their welfare does not demand that they 
be returned.'' 27 C.J.S. at 1180. So in this ease the 
welfare of the children is best served by remaining in 
the state of Oregon. On that there can be no dispute. 
In the case of Altschuler v. Altschuler, 284 N.Y.S. 
93 at 94, the court said, ''Order modifying an order en-
tered August 19, 1934, punishing plaintiff for contempt 
for failue to pay alimony, by eliminating therefrom the 
provisions requiring· ·him to pay current alimony of 
$30.00 a week during the time that his right of visitation 
of the children is denied him, reversed on the law ... 
The decree, as amended, provides that the plaintiff 
have the right to visit his children at all reasonable 
times and places. While the defendant, in removing the 
children to California, violated this provision of the 
decree, nevertheless the court was without power, on 
this motion, to relieve the plaintiff from his obligation 
to pay for the support and maintenance of his children 
14 
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until he first secured a modification of the final decree. 
Dube v. Dube 245 N.Y.S. 287, Gibson v. Gibson, 143. N. 
Y.S. 37." 
Though the appellant were guilty of contempt, which 
is not admitted, the court exceeded its authority in order-
ing that appellant he ''deprived of the right to enforce 
payment by defendant to her of the sums accruing upon 
support moneys, under the terms of such Decree, from 
November 25th, 1948, to the end of February, 1949 ... " 
( Tr. 062). There is error in three respects in this 
order. First, the support money was for the support 
and maintenance of the minor children of the parties 
and not for the appellant, so that the order made by the 
court withholding payment of $350.00 and reducing 
monthly payments was a penalty on the children rather 
than on the appellant. Second, the installments had 
already accrued and the payment of them could not be 
modified by the court. Third, the penalty imposed is 
in direct violation of statute. 
The first two errors are either self explanatory or 
covered elsewhere in this brief. (Points I, II, III, IV, 
and V) 
"The law punishes the contemner out of no personal 
consideration for the judge, or the litigant, but only 
when the best ends of justice will be subserved thereby. 
Punishment may be either punitive, to vindicate the 
authority of the law, or remedial, to compel the per-
formance of some order or decree which, although in 
his power to perform, the person refused to obey, and 
to accomplish its object punitive punishment for con-
tempt may extend to acts of past disobedience.'' 13 C.J. 
15 
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at 86. The question is raised by this citation as to 
'vhether or not ''the best ends of justice will be sub-
served'' by the punishment imposed by the court against 
the appellant. ~ictually the appellant is not the one 
punished. The t\YO minor children of the parties are 
the ones on ''Thorn the burden of the punishment falls. 
There has been a court order made in their interest 
because of a need sho\\rn to exist for the support of the 
children. They are the ones injured by the ruling of 
the court in that support money on which they rely 
for necessary subsistance has been taken from them 
and the natural duty of the father to support his child-
ren, as recognized at common law and by statutes,. is 
abrogated. 
;. 
The statutes providing for the punishment of con-
tempt, U.C.A. 1943, 104-45-10 and 104-45-11, are exclusive 
as to the punishment which can be imposed. They pro-
vide for three types of punishment, to-wit: a fine, im-
prisonment, or both fine and imprisonment, or, if an 
actual loss or injury to a party prejudicial to his rights 
is caused by the contempt, the court may, in addition to 
the fine andjor imprisonment, order the person pro-
ceeded against to pay the aggrieved party a sum of 
money sufficient to indemnify him for the loss suffered. 
No other punishment is mentioned either directly or 
indirectly. As is set 'forth in 12 Am. Jur. at 432, "Any 
punishment set out in the statutes is exclusive . . . '' 
That being so the court has exceeded its authority by 
penalizing the appellant in a manner not authorized 
under statute. 
Furthermore, the maximum fine provided by statute 
is $200.00 (Sec. 104-45-10 U.C.A. 1943). 
16 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING APPELLANT 
OF THE RIGHT TO COLLECT PAST DUE IN-
STALLMENTS OF SUPPOR,T MONEY FROM THE 
RESPONDENT AND IN HEARING RESPONDENT 
ON HIS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION WHILE 
HE WAS IN DEFAULT UNDE~R THE DECREE 
The support and maintenance allowed to the appel-
lant by the decree of divorce was solely for the benefit 
of ·the minor children of the parties. Nothing was 
awarded to the appellant in the form of alimony or sup-
port money. The court was without power in any way 
to modify the original decree of divorce as to payments 
of support past due. Yet the court in this case has 
expressly ''deprived'' appellant of her legal right to 
collect from the respondent that which was already 
vested in her. 
As set forth in 27 C.J.S at 1239, the law is, "Pay-
ments exacted by the original decree of divorce become 
vested in the payee as they accrue, and the court, on 
application to modify such decree, is without authority 
to reduce the amounts or modify the decree with refer-
enee thereto retrospectively, unless some reservation is 
made in the decree itself; the modifying decree relates 
to the future only and from the time of its entry. 
Defendant's application to set aside order for main· 
tenance of children or reduction of the award will not 
be considered until he pays all arrears due the original 
decree.'' 
17 
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The lTtah Supreme l~ourt has held that to be the 
la"·· ~leyers Y. ~!eyers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123, 30 A. 
L.R. 74. 
See also Adair vs. Superior Court (Ariz.) 33 P. 
2nd 996: 19 C.J. 359; ·\v·assung vs. Wassung, 286 N.W. 
349; Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 636; Delbridge v. Sears, 160 
N.W. 218; Craig· v. Craig, 45 N.E. 155; Pottinger v. 
Potting·er, 18:2 So. 763; Van Loon v. Van Loon, 182 So. 
205; State v. Hall (Ore.) 55 P. 2nd 1105. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN TAKING FROM THE 
CHILDREN THE ~IONEY AWARDED TO THEM 
UNDER THE GUISE OF PUNISHING THE 
MOTHER FOR CONTEniPT. 
There is nothing in the decree in this action which 
indicates that the payments for the support of the child-
ren are conditioned on the right of visitation awarded 
to the respondent. The two rights are independent of 
each other. The New Jersey case of Hatch v. Hatch, 
192 A. 241, in such an action held that an order entered 
in a divorce action requiring payments by a father for 
maintenance of the child was not conditioned on the 
right of visitation granted the husband in a decree where 
custody of a child was a\Yarded. to the wife. 
Nothing which \Ve have found in the Utah law makes 
the two rights dependent on each other. Certainly the 
right of visitation to a natural parent of children is 
important. None will deny that. But more lln.portant 
is the right of the children to have proper care. This 
18 
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cannot be given wit~out adequate financial assistance, 
and that a~sistance in this case, as in most instances, 
must come from the father, the respondent in this action. 
The New Jersey court in the case of Feinberg v. 
Feinberg, 66 Atlantic at qll held, "It is clearly con-
trary to the terms of Section 7 of the act concerning the 
custody and maintenance of minor children (L.L. 1902, 
p. 259) for defendant to remove the minor in question 
out of the jurisdiction of this court, without first ob-
taining the consent of the petitioner or an order of this 
eourt ·for that purpose. I am unable, however, to re-
lieve against the payment of sueh moneys as have 
accrued under the existing decree during the period in 
'vhich no complaint has been made to the court touching 
such removal. It is not the privilege of petitioner to 
refuse payments accruing pursuant to the terms of the 
decree. When nevv conditions arise, 'vhich in the opinion 
of petitioner, entitle him to a modification of the decree, 
he should make application to the court for such modifi-
cation,~ if he desires to avail himself of rights arising 
from the n,ew conditions.'' 
In the foregoing case the child was moved from New 
Jersey to Pittsburg. No reduction in payments was 
allowed as no changes in the condition of the parties 
were shown except as to the convenience involved in 
exercising the right of visitation. Utah has no statute 
similar to that of New Jersey expressly forbidding the 
removal of children a warded in a divorce action from 
the state. The New Jersey court felt that even in the 
face of such a direct la,v, the duty of the father to sup-
port the children was paramount. That is the only 
reasonable conclusion to dra-\v. The daughters of the 
parties in the inst~t case are too young to he left alone, 
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and that makes it impractical. if not impossible, for the 
appellant to obtain full time employment to support the 
children. The duty of support rests with the respond~ 
ent regardless of the residence of the children. 
In Zirkle Y. Zirkle, 202 Ind. 129, 172 N.E. 192, the 
defendant ''as ordered, under the decree of divorce, to 
make weekly payments to the plaintiff for the support 
of their child, the custody of which had been given to 
plaintiff. In that case, as in this one, the. defendant 
had been given the right to visit the child at all reason-
able times. In holding that the- fact that plaintiff had 
removed the_ child to another state., thus depriving de~ 
fendant of his right of visitation, did not constitute a 
defense to an action to recover the weekly payments, 
the court said: ''It must he presumed that the order as 
to custody and support of the child was made for the 
benefit of the child. The child was and still is entitled 
to have the order executed. The order has not been 
modified or set aside. The decree did not provide that 
the child should be kept in the state. It does not appear 
that appellee (defendant) ever attempted to have the 
order modified, or ever made any effort through the 
court to have the child returned to the court's juris-
diction or to this state. If the appellant, without the 
consent of the court, or without right, took the child 
out of the state, that act did not give the appellee any 
reason for refusing to make the weekly payments which 
the court had ordered.'' 
To hold otherwise would he to punish children for 
the errors of the parent over which they had no control. 
A child must do as directed by the parent and cannot 
dictate to the parent where the residence shall be.. The 
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child must· go with its parent.-custodian. Without a 
choice in the matter there can. be no reason presented 
to punish the child for any fault that might lie with a 
parent in whose custody the child is. 
The matter of the state of residence of the child is 
not the question of fundamental importance. That which 
is important is the well being of the child. 
''In judicial appointments of custodians for child-
ren, the residence, actual or prospective, of the appointee, 
is now a factor of minor importance-a subordinate 
consideration. Although residence is ·not wholly ignored, 
it has become, in modern times at least, altogether a 
secondary element, influencing the court in deciding 
whether or not to appoint an applicant. The primary 
questions to be answered before that of residence arises, 
when a child's custodian is to be named, relate to the 
conservation and promotion of its interests; the safety 
of its estate; its welfare and happiness in a changed 
environment; the fitness, ability, and suitability of the 
proposed custodian to be entrusted with the child's care, 
education, and maintenance; the age, sex, and circum-
stances of the child, and the comparative claims of kin-
ship to it among those from whom the choic.e of custodian 
must be made. It is only when all these questions have 
been satisfactorily answered in favor of the applicant 
that the question of residence is considered by the court, 
in the light of its advantages and disadvantages as a 
dwelling place for the child. If, then, these are favor-
able,· the mere fact that the home is located outside of 
the state seems to be immaterial.'' 20 A.L.R. 838. 
A note in 88 A.L.R. at 200 states the law as followH: 
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~~In Helmbold v. Helmbold, 217 N.Y. Supp. 
37!1, it was held that the failure of a wife to ob-
serve the provisions in a divorce decree in her 
favor, relating to the right of the defendant to 
see and Yisi t his children, was no excuse· for re-
fusing to pay the alimony awarded, where the 
payment of alimony ""as not made conditional 
upon the observance of the provision in the de-
cree in regard to the children. . The court said 
that the defendant had a remedy under the decree 
to compel observance of such provision, just as 
the plaintiff might pursue her remedy to compel 
the payment of alimony.'' 
The same citation further says: 
''Thus, where a provision in an order for 
alimony pendente lite, that the defendant husband 
should be allowed to visit and see his child twice 
a week during the pendency of the action in New 
York, as might be agreed upon or as the court 
should thereafter direct, was not made a con-
dition precedent to the payment of the alimony 
ordered, it was held in Schweig v. Schweig, 107 
N.Y. Supp. 905, that the failure of the- plaintiff 
wife to obey such provision w·ould not furnish jus-
tification for the nonpayment of the alimony and 
counsel fee allowed, so long as the order re-
mained unreversed. 
• 'As hearing on the possible distinction be-
tween the effect of a violation by the wife, of a 
divorce decree, on her right to recover alimony 
as such and her right to recover payments or-
dered to be made for the support of a minor child 
or children, it is of interest to note that it was 
declared in Thomas v. Thomas, 233 Ill. App. 488, 
that, even if a mother were in contempt of court 
for failing to comply with the provisions of a 
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divorce decree whereby the father was to he al-
lowed to visit the minor child placed in her cus-
tody, the father was ~till liable for the child's 
support, and the court should compel the per-
formance of such duty." 
This last holding is just and equitable. Any other 
ruling results only in the punishment of the children. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING THE PLAIN-
TIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO PURGE HERSELF 
FROM CONTEMPT IF SHE WERE IN CONTEMPT. 
The appellant asserts that there was no proper or 
legal ground upon which the court order finding her in 
.contempt can be based. However, if it he assumed for 
the sake of argument that the appellant was in con-
tempt by removing the children to the State of Oregon, 
surely unless the court felt that the children were better 
off in Oregon than they would be in Utah, it should 
have directed their return to Utah.. The fact that the 
respondent made no request to have the children re-
turned to this jurisdiction, and that the court made no 
order to that effect, show that in the opinion of the re-
·spondent and of the cou·rt the children were better off 
where they are. If the court felt that the children 
properly belonged in Utah, it should have directed their . 
retu.rn to Utah, and have permitted the appellant to 
purge herself from contempt by complying 'vith the 
order to return the children. But the court gave the 
appellant no alternative whatever. It took from her 
and the children the $350.00 which had accrued and 
which was payable a.t the time the respondent applied 
for modification of the decree, and further reduced the 
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sum payable for the support of the children from $50.00 
each to $30.00 each per month "·ithout any showing 
'vhate,·er that the amount of $60.00 is adequate for their 
support, and in the face of the positive showing that 
the $100.00 originally a"~arded is necessary. Again the 
court did not give the appellant any opportunity to 
avoid the penalty of that drastic reduction by returning 
the children to Utah, or by doing anything else although 
the reduction must be eonsidered as nothing but ·an ad-
ditional penalty against the appellant and the children. 
It is unprecedented for a court to make such fast and 
hard orders without providing any means for the appel-
lant and the children to escape the severe penalties im-
posed. 
It will be recalled that the respondent while ob-
viously in contempt was in effect rewarded for his 
contempt by being permitted to retain $350.00 past due 
support money, and although found in contempt for 
his deliberate refusal to pay over $300.00 in attorneys' 
fees and costs a\varded under the original deeree, he 
wasn't even "slapped on the wrist", but was permitted 
to purge himself merely by paying part of that which 
he already owed. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN RIDFUSING TO MODIFY 
THE ORIGINAL DECREE SO AS TO GIVE THE 
APPELLANT THE EXPRESS RIGHT TO CON-
TINUE THE RESIDENCE OF THE CHILDREN IN 
THE STATE OF OREGON. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In her petition to the court the appellant expressly 
requested that the decree be so modified as to permit 
her to keep the children with her at her place of residence 
.in Oregon (Tr. 044). 
The evidence shows that it is for the best interests 
of the children to remain in Oregon (B. of Ex. 19, 20, 
23 and 24). There was no evidence at all introduced or 
before the court indicating that the children are not 
happy, well cared for and generally well situated where 
they are now living. The whole theory of the respond-
ent's case has no relation to the welfare of the children, 
but relates only to his own desires and conve~ience.. It 
is really based on his desire to escape the payment of 
all support money .. That he is a harsh, domineering, 
profane and vulgar man appears definitely from the 
findings of the court in the original decree ( Tr. 017-
018). 
Finding No. 4 made by the court in the original action 
( Tr. 017) among other things set forth ''that frequently 
and more or less continuously defendant has displayed 
toward plaintiff a mean and disagreeable nature and dis-
position and a violent and explosive temper, and has 
on occasion hit and struck plaintiff violently and in 
anger without any provocation whatever, and has be-
come angl"Y at the children of the parties hereto, and 
has abused them with angry terms and bas on occasions 
bit them without good reason and without justifiable 
provocation; that defendant abuses plaintiff with vile 
and obscene language and epithets, and curses and 
swears at her and at the children; that the defendant 
at times evidences to plaintiff a morose and sullen dis-
position; and at times defendant has threatened plain-
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tiff and the children \Yith 8Uch violence as to put plain-
tiff and ~aid children in g'reat fear and terror of the 
defendant; that defendant dominates plaintiff and the 
children and the house hold of the parties hereto or 
seeks to dominate them; and insists on making all de-
cisions of any consequence \Yith respect to plaintiff and 
the home of the parties hereto, without consideration 
of plaintiff's vie\YS and despite her protests or object-
ions; that defendant assumes to,vard plaintiff an atti-
tude of great superiority and arrogates to himself the 
right to make all family determinations in· the full ex-
pectation on his part that his views should he carried 
out unquestioningly.'' 
The appellant pointed out to the court that when 
the respondent visited the children he made them ner-
vous and irritable, and at times acted like a maniac (B. 
of Ex. 2). 
Furthermore, the appellant has disposed of all her 
holdings in Utah, has established a home in Oregon, and 
is able to carry on her home life more advantageously 
with her children where she is now situated (B. of Ex. 
17 et seq.). 
The court,· of course, found in effect the children 
should remain in Oregon by making no order that they 
should be returned, but still left the appellant dangling 
as to her position in the eyes of the court, under the 
decree, through refusing to modify the decree so as to 
permit the change of residence. 
POINT VII 
'£HE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO E;NTER 
'rHE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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AND DECREE SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT 
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE LAW 
.AND THE EVIDENCE AND THE FINDINGS, CON-
.CLUSIO.NS AND DECREE AS ENTERED ARE NOT. 
The appellant submitted to the court after the hear-
ing on the application for modification her proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree (Tr. 049-
·o55). The trial court rejected them in their entirety 
and signed the findings, conclusions and decree as sub-
mitted by counsel for respondent after making t'vo 
·.changes to correct some obvious mistakes in computation. 
It is submitted that the findings and decree pro-· 
posed by the appellant are in accordance with. the evi-
dence and law in the case, and that the findings, con-
clusions and decree submitted by the respondent and 
signed· by the court are not supported by the evidence 
or by the law. 
The 5th finding ( Tr. 059) is wholly immaterial to the 
issues involved because it does not relate to the earn-
ings of the respondent and does not show any change 
of circumstances taken into consideration by the court 
at the time the amount for support of the children was 
·fixed. 
Finding No. 4 (Tr. · 059) is not supported by the 
evidence except as to the fact that the respondent now 
earns $350.00 to $400.00 per month "take home pay". 
There are. no facts and there is no evidence to sup-
port conclusions of law Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Tr. 060 and 
061). 
The decree is not supported by the evidence or by 
the findings, and that part of the decree finding the 
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appellant in contempt is void in that the court is without 
jurisdiction and po"rer to impose the penalty provided 
in the second paragraph of the decree (Tr. 062) . 
.... \s argued in other parts of this brief, the decr~e 
of the court is 'vholly in variance with the law. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT CON-
CERNING THE ~IOR.A.L UNFITNESS OF THERE-
SPONDENT TO BE ALONE: WITH THE CHILDREN. 
The appellant offered to prove that the respondent 
ha"d made indecent advances toward a daughter of the 
appellant by a former marriage, and had told the ap-
pellant's son by a former marriage that he was a fool 
if he didn't have intimate relations with his sister, and 
if the brother didn't the respondent would; that the 
respondent further wanted to take indecent liberties 
with his own infant daughters (B. of Ex. 34). 
In the entire record in this case there is not an 
iota of evidence that the appellant at any time has been 
anything except a clean, wholesome, virtuous wife and 
mother while the record abounds in evidence against 
the fitness of the respondent. 
The original case didn't go by default, hut was a 
contested case, and the court's findings are based upon 
an open airing of issues in court. 
It is submitted that in a case involving the wel-
fare of two infant girls the scope of inquiry as to the 
fitness of a man like the respondent to be alone with 
these little girls should be much greater than on ordi-
nary occasions. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the 
de.eree of the lower court appealed from cannot be up-
held. There ·cannot be found in the record support 
for the court's order reducing the amount of the pay-
ments for the maintenance of the children. The court 
exceeded ~ts jurisdiction in refusing to permit the ap-
pellant to eollect the past due installments of support 
money for the ehildren, finding the appellant in con-
tempt and. imp·osing upon her excessive and unpre-
cedented penalties. The court in effect punished the 
children in whose welfare the appellant was acting, and 
rewarded the respondent for h~s meanness and his wilful 
refusal to comply wi~h the court decree. The court erred 
in letting the respondent be heard at all until he had 
paid into court at least all his past due delinquent in-
stallments under the original decree and erred in re-
fusing· to give the appellant an opportunity to purge 
herself from contempt if she were in contempt. It is 
further submitted that the court erred in refusing to 
put an express provision into t)le decree permitting the 
ap·p~llant to retain the residence of the children in 
Oregon; that the court erred in rejecting evidence 
offered hy the appellant and in refusing to adopt the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree sub-
mitted hy the appellant. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court should 
reinstate the terms of the decree as they relate to sup .. 
_port and direet that the respondent pay the accrued sums 
in full; that the decree should be modified so as to per-
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mit the children to remain in Oregon, and that the 
appellant should be purged for the alleged contempt; 
that the court should R\\yard to the appellant attorneys' 
fees for prosecuting this appeal together with her 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID J. WILSON 
of WILsoN & WILsoN, 
Attorneys for Appellarnt 
David Eccles Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Appellant's Address 
Nyssa, Oregon 
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